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POST-SOX TRENDS IN DELISTINGS
AND DEREGISTRATION
Samuel Wolff *
Clarence D. Long IV**
It is well known that in recent years a number of companies,
both domestic and foreign, have delisted from U.S. securities ex-
changes, ceased reporting to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), and/or gone private.  This trend is frequently attributed to the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20021 (“SOX”) or the burdens of
U.S. regulation in general, as well as, among other things, the litiga-
tion and enforcement environment in the United States.2  In this arti-
cle, we review recent SEC filings for the purpose of documenting the
number of departing issuers that in their public disclosures gave SOX
(or U.S. regulatory burdens in general) as a principal reason for exit-
ing the U.S. markets.
We review filings that an issuer is required to make in order to
change its status as a reporting company under the U.S. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).  An issuer generally files a
Form 15 with the SEC when it decides to deregister from SEC report-
ing requirements due to having a limited number of shareholders.3  A
foreign issuer files a Form 15F with the SEC to deregister under the
Exchange Act due to low trading volume in the United States in com-
parison to a foreign listing.4  A foreign private issuer with a foreign
* Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP; A.B. Brown University; J.D.
and LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center; S.J.D. University of Wisconsin
School of Law.
** Attorney, Mayer Brown LLP; B.A., College of William and Mary; J.D., Univer-
sity of Richmond.  Reprinted by permission of Thomson Reuters/West from Emerg-
ing Trends in Securities Law 2009–2010, by Harold Bloomenthal and Samuel
Wolff,  Thomson Reuters/West.
1 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745. See generally
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE: 2008–2009 EDI-
TION (2008) (discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its impact on the area of se-
curities law and regulation).
2 See COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMIT-
TEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 71–72 (2006), available at http://www.cap
mktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (last visited July 26,
2009).
3 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12g-4, 240.12h-3; see SEC Form 15, available at http://www.sec.
gov/about/forms/form15.pdf.
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-6; see SEC Form 15F, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/
forms/form15f.pdf.
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listing may also file a Form 15F to deregister under the Exchange Act
based upon a low number of foreign and/or U.S. shareholders.5  An is-
suer files a Form 25 to notify the SEC of its withdrawal of securities
from listing on a national securities exchange, such as the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) or Nasdaq, and of its intention to withdraw
the securities from registration under Section 12(b) of the Exchange
Act.6  An issuer “going private” (technically, engaging in a “Rule 13e-3
transaction”) is generally required to file a Schedule 13E-3.7  Each of
these forms, except Form 15F, may be filed by foreign or domestic issu-
ers; Form 15F may only be filed by foreign private issuers.
The authors reviewed the above-referenced filings with the
SEC, disclosures in other SEC documents and press releases for the
periods shown (generally 2002 through the second quarter of 2008) in
an effort to assess the extent to which registrants in delisting, deregis-
tering, or going private stated that their principal reason was SOX or
burdens or costs of U.S. securities regulation in general.  We present
raw data and do not attempt to control for market conditions, types of
securities, or any other variables.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in 2002.8  The most oner-
ous provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act—Section 404, the internal
controls provisions9—was phased in two or more years later.  To over-
simplify the complex history of the Section 404 phase-in, all “acceler-
ated filers” under the Exchange Act became subject to Section 404
requirements for fiscal years ending after November 14, 2004.10  Non-
accelerated filers were not required to file management’s Section
404(a) report until fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2007.11
Non-accelerated filers are not required to file the auditors’ attestation
required by section 404(b) until the first fiscal year ending on or after
December 15, 2010.12
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-6(a)(4)(ii).  Form 15F and Rule 12h-6 were both promul-
gated in 2007.  Termination of a Foreign Private Issuer’s Registration of a Class of
Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 34,55540, 72 Fed. Reg. 16934 (Apr. 5, 2007).
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-2(c)(1); see SEC Form 25, available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/forms/form25.pdf.
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(d); Securities Lawyer’s Deskbook, http://www.law.uc.edu/
CCL/34ActRls/rule13e-100.html.
8 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745.
9 See COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 2, at 115.
10 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 1, at § 3:31.
11 COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 2, at 118.
12 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 1, at § 3:31; see Release 33-9072 (Oct. 13, 2009).
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I. DEREGISTRATIONS
Presented in Table 1 below is a summary of Form 1513 filings
during the periods shown and the number of instances in which the
registrant gave SOX (or related U.S. regulatory burdens) as the princi-
pal reason for filing.  The data presented below reflect an increasing
number and percentage of Form 15 filings that specify SOX or U.S.
regulatory burdens in general as a principal reason for deregistering
under the Exchange Act.
Table 1 - Form 15 Filings
Year No. of No. of Giving SOX % Giving SOX
Filings As Reason for Filing As Reason
2000 710 n/a n/a
2001 805 n/a n/a
2002 261 15 6%
7/31/02-12/31/02
2003 744 5 1%
2004 737 47 6%
2005 720 71 10%
2006 654 78 12%
2007 706 110 16%
2008 302 53 18%
(through second
quarter)
Presented in Table 2 below is a summary of the number and
percentage of Form 15F14 filings during the specified period that gave
SOX (or related U.S. regulatory burdens) as the principal reason for
filing.  (Note, again, that Form 15F was adopted in 2007).  Almost one
third of issuers filing Form 15F during the periods shown gave SOX or
U.S. regulatory burdens as a principal reason for their decision to der-
egister under the Exchange Act and cease reporting to the SEC.
II. DELISTINGS
As shown in Table 3 below, a smaller percentage of issuers de-
listing from a U.S. national securities exchange cited SOX as the rea-
son for delisting.  Issuers listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq tend to be
13 SEC Form 15, supra note 3.
14 SEC Form 15F, supra note 4.
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larger, better capitalized issuers.  Still, through the second quarter of
2008, ten percent of such issuers cited SOX or U.S. regulation as a
principal reason for delisting, whereas twenty-six percent of delisting
issuers cited SOX or regulatory burdens during 2007.
Table 2 - Form 15F Filings
Year No. of No. of Giving % Giving SOX
Filings SOX As Reason As Reason
2007 135 43 32%
2008 48 15 31%
(through second
quarter)
Table 3 – Form 25 Filings
Year No. of No. of Giving % Giving SOX
Filings SOX As Reason As Reason
2003 468 3 .6%
2004 445 8 1.8%
2005 428 4 .9%
2006 333 15 4.5%
2007 334 88 26%
2008 289 29 10%
(through second
quarter)
III. GOING PRIVATE
Finally, we reviewed Schedule 13E filings15 to assess the ex-
tent to which registrants going private pursuant to Rule 13e-3 stated
that a principal reason for doing so was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or bur-
dens or costs of U.S. securities regulation in general.  Table 4 presents
a summary of the number and percentage of Schedules 13E-3 filed
during the specified period that gave SOX (or related U.S. regulatory
burdens) as a reason for filing a Schedule 13E-3.  This number has
climbed from under twenty percent in 2003 to over fifty percent for the
first two quarters of 2008.
15 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(d).
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Table 4 - Schedule 13E-3 Filings
Year No. of No. of Giving % Giving SOX
Filings SOX As Reason As Reason
2000 125 n/a n/a
2001 171 n/a n/a
2002 52 10 19%
7/31/02-12/31/02
2003 173 33 19%
2004 116 21 18%
2005 130 21 16%
2006 142 28 20%
2007 89 43 48%
2008 24 13 54%
(through second
quarter)
IV. DISCUSSION
These results should be viewed in the context of the work of
other commentators who document an increase in delistings, deregis-
trations and decisions to go private following the passage of SOX, as
well as a decrease in firms’ listings or initial public offerings in the
United States.16  The data presented above should also be viewed in
16 Stanley Block, The Latest Movement to Going Private: An Empirical Study, 14
J. APPLIED FIN. 36, 36 (Spring 2004) (finding an increase in going private transac-
tions and stating that the “cost of being public is the number one reason for going
private by smaller firms”); Ellen Engel et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms’
Going Private-Decisions 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 116, 118, 126 (2007) (“[t]he data
show a substantial increase in the number of firms undertaking going-private
transactions after the enactment of SOX”.  The authors examined Schedule 13E-3
filings, excluding foreign issuers and certain other filers.); Ehud Kamar et al.,
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Effects on Small Firms: What is the Evidence 19–20 (Harv. L.
Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for L., Econ. & Bus. Discussion, Paper No. 588, (2007)),
http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/588/; Christian Leuz et al., Why Do Firms Go
Dark? Causes and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations, 45 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 181, 183 (2008) (documenting “a spike in going dark that is largely
attributable to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act” and stating that “we find that the time
pattern of going-dark decisions is closely associated with the passage of SOX and
the timing of policy changes regarding the implementation of the internal controls
requirement in Section 404 . .”  and not finding an increase in going private trans-
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the context of other indicators of the attractiveness of U.S. capital
markets.  There are currently sixty-nine U.S. companies admitted for
quotation on AIM, the market for growth companies that is part of the
London Stock Exchange.17  In 2008, of the total IPOs of U.S. compa-
nies, seven of them reportedly listed their securities only abroad.18
The U.S. share of the twenty largest global IPOs was zero of twenty in
2007, zero of twenty in 2008, and one of nine in the first quarter of
2009; from 1996 to 2006, an average of five of the largest twenty global
IPOs listed on a U.S. exchange.19  In terms of funds raised, the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange was the leading exchange in the world in 2007,
the London Stock Exchange was second, and the New York Stock Ex-
change third.20  In 2008, for the first time in three years, the U.S. ex-
changes slightly outperformed the European exchanges in terms of
funds raised,21 but this was in part attributable to the almost eighteen
actions during the sample period); Andra´s Marosi & Nadia Massoud, Why Do
Firms Go Dark?, 42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (No. 2) 421, 426 (June 2007)
(stating that “the number of firms going dark has grown dramatically over time.
The increase is the highest after Sarbanes-Oxley . . .”); Joseph Piotroski & Suraj
Srinivasan, Regulation and Bonding: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow of In-
ternational Listings, 46 J. ACCT. RES. (NO. 2) 383, 388 (May 2008) (observing a
decline in the rate of U.S. listings post-SOX among smaller foreign firms, consis-
tent with smaller firms being unable to absorb the incremental costs of SOX).  Not
all commenters evaluating the impact of SOX on U.S. markets have reached the
same conclusion. Ehud Kamar et al., Going Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002:A Cross-Country Analysis 2 (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Work-
ing Paper No. WR-300-2-EMKF, 2008) (showing a relative increase in going pri-
vate transactions by small U.S. firms in the first year after SOX); Xi Li, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Cross-Listed Foreign Private Issuers 29 (2d Annual Con-
ference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, Working Paper No. G15, 2007), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=952433.
17 London Stock Exchange, AIM Statistics, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/
statistics/companies-and-issuers/companies-and-issuers.htm (visited Oct. 3, 2009).
18 Press Release, Comm. On Capital Markets Regulation, Continued Erosion in
Competitiveness of U.S. Public Equity Market Was Among the Few Clear Trends
During 2008 Market Chaos (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/press
Release/idUS150050+24-Mar-2009+PRN20090324.
19  Id.  A different source reports that of the top twenty largest IPOs in 2007, two
had their primary listing in the United States.  Most of the top twenty IPOs listed
on domestic exchanges.  A decade ago, local stock markets were not as mature
“and most large international companies would be compelled to list either in the
US or London.” See ERNST & YOUNG, GROWTH DURING ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY:
GLOBAL IPO TRENDS REPORT 2008 5, 14 (2009).
20 See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 19, at 4.
21 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, IPO WATCH EUROPE, REVIEW OF THE YEAR 2008 21
(2009).
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billion dollar VISA IPO, the largest IPO in U.S. history.22  Europe out-
performed the U.S. in 2008 in terms of international IPOs (listings by
foreign companies).23
Our results indicate that a significant number of issuers have
departed the United States, reporting publicly that one of the principal
reasons for doing so is SOX or the burdens of U.S. regulation in gen-
eral.  Among the other reasons for issuers to depart the United States
are the litigation/enforcement environments in the United States24
and the growth and maturation of foreign markets:  issuers now have
several real alternatives to the U.S. securities markets.  By reporting
findings, we do not comment on the merits of SOX or suggest that U.S.
securities regulation is necessarily too burdensome.  However, we do
suggest that U.S. policymakers bear in mind as they formulate and
implement U.S. policies that issuers now have several alternatives to
U.S. markets.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress is currently considering major reforms to the system
of financial regulation,25 and the Schapiro Commission is pursuing an
invigorated enforcement program.26  We are not suggesting that major
changes to financial regulation are not in order or that the SEC en-
forcement program is unjustified.  We are merely suggesting that as
U.S. policymakers pursue their agendas, they bear in mind that the
international securities markets look very different than they did ten
to fifteen years ago.  More than ever before, issuers have a choice of
markets for capital-raising and secondary market trading.  Of course,
engaging in a “race to the bottom” in order to maintain market share is
not in U.S. interest either.  Efforts toward international regulatory co-
operation or convergence can be useful in this regard.  In considering
the upcoming round of legislative and regulatory changes in response
to the recent financial crisis, regulators should take the time to ensure
they are striking the right balance among competing regulatory
objectives.
22 Michael Liedtke, Visa IPO Biggest in U.S. History, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar.19,
2008.
23 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 21, at 21.
24 COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION, supra note 2, at 71.
25 See generally DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009).
26 Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Chief Pursues Tougher Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
22, 2009.
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